The remains of the Sampoong Department store on June 29 1995, just hours after it collapsed @National Library of Korea



The collapse of Sampoong Department Store on June 29 1995, 30 years ago, was a significant social event that fundamentally reflected Korean society beyond the absurd construction accident in which a huge pink building collapsed from the fifth floor to the third basement floor. The accident killed and injured 502 people and injured 937. The accident is the highest death toll in Korea so far. It was the first accident in two months since the gas explosion at the Daegu subway construction site and eight months after the collapse of the Seongsu Bridge.

Originally, Sampoong Department Store was designed as a large complex comprehensive shopping mall named Sampoong Shopping, and was constructed by Woosung Construction. However, as it was nearing completion, Joon Lee (Chairman of Sampoong Department Store), the client, suddenly changed the purpose of the building to a department store and asked the construction company to put one more floor on the four floors that were originally scheduled to be constructed as a five-story building. Woosung E&C, the contractor, refused to expand the building due to the risk of collapse, and Lee broke the construction contract with Woosung E&C in the middle and allowed his construction company, Sampoong E&C, to continue the construction. When making a design change, a structural expert’s review is essential for a complex building such as a department store, but the design was changed arbitrarily, ignoring the safety of the building. If the design had not been changed excessively, the accident would not have occurred.

Sampoong Department Store has changed its roller skating rink to a restaurant since its opening, frequently changing its use. If the actual load exceeds the design load due to the change in use, the store had to undergo diagnostic and structural review before taking reinforcement measures. Sampoong Department Store, however, did not take any measures. The three air-conditioning cooling towers on the roof dealt a significant blow to the Sampoong Department Store building, which had been in place for five and a half years despite numerous poor construction and problems. These cooling towers weighed 87 tons, more than four times the load the rooftop could withstand, causing subtle vibrations and water leaks from the beginning of the opening. Initially, the cooling tower was installed on the east side of the department store’s rooftop, but the cooling tower was moved to the other side before its official opening in December 1989 as residents of nearby Sampoong Apartment continued to complain due to the noise of the cooling tower. However, Sampoong Department Store made a big mistake in the process. Heavy objects such as air conditioning cooling towers had to be moved by cranes at once in consideration of the impact on the building, but a method of moving them to the opposite side by attaching rollers under the cooling tower and pulling them from the rooftop top was used. As a result, enormous pressure and shock were applied to the rooftop floor and support structure as a result of the 12 tons of cooling towers per unit being moved. In addition, after the opening, the vibrations generated by the cooling tower were continuously transmitted to the five-story structures, including the rooftop, causing cracks.

The collapse of Sampoong Department Store was an accident that clearly revealed the so-called ‘people’s capitalism’ that was prevalent in Korean society. It can be said that the cause of this accident was both technical and social. The technical cause is poor design change, construction and management, and the social cause is the corruption that made this total insolvency possible.

In our 30 years of reflection on the collapse of Sampoong Department Store, we should pay particular attention to the problem of the client, the main cause of this accident, as previously discussed, and efforts have been made to solve various problems related to technical and social causes to ensure the safety of construction work 30 years after the Sampoong Department Store collapse. However, the orderer system, which can be said to be a key problem in the technical cause of construction work, has not been able to approach solving essential problems.

The Serious Accident Punishment Act, which served as an important background for the enactment of the law by the fire accident (38 deaths) at the construction site of the Icheon warehouse on April 29 2020, is also far from solving the problem of the client. In order to reduce serious accidents including construction accidents, the extreme prescription of enacting the Serious Accident Punishment Act, which is unprecedented in the world, has not come close to solving the problem of the client for construction work at all.

As a result of focusing too much on strengthening punishment, the Serious Accident Punishment Act neglected to clearly establish the most basic and important obligatory entity for the prevention of serious accidents. It is virtually impossible to determine in advance who should take safety and health measures in advance as the mandatory entity is defined very unclearly as “a person who actually controls, operates, and manages facilities, equipment, and places.” In the case of construction work, which involves several entities such as clients, original contractors, subcontractors, re-subcontractors, and equipment companies, each expert has different judgments on who should take safety and health measures, and even the competent ministries have not been able to give a proper answer.

The government is consistent with an ambiguous position on the obligatory entity, and is vaguely taking the position that it is a constructor only for the entity (responsible entity) to be held accountable. Even so, the Ministry of Employment and Labor points to both general and professional construction companies, and the prosecution gives mixed explanations that only general construction companies are applicable.

Apart from the problem of the regulations of the obligatory entity and the accuracy of the interpretation of the obligatory entity and the responsible entity, the client is excluded from both the obligatory entity and the responsible entity according to the interpretation of any institution. Although the client occupies an important position in preventing construction accidents, the client has been excluded from the obligations and punishments of the Serious Accident Punishment Act. It can be said that this is a ridiculous result enacted without neglecting the basic safety principle that obligations and responsibilities appropriate to the status and role of the obligatory entity. This is also a point that proves that the Serious Accident Punishment Act can have a much greater dysfunction than a pure function in preventing safety accidents.

In order for the Serious Accident Punishment Act to contribute to the prevention of the recurrence of disasters such as the collapse of Sampoong Department Store, it should be reorganized in the direction of including the client as the subject of obligation and responsibility, and elaborately preparing structures and means to realize the obligation and responsibility. Otherwise, the Serious Accident Punishment Act may be reduced to an obstacle law that is worse than no other purpose beyond the level of fading its legislative purpose.



Jinwoo Jung



(Safety Engineering /Associate Professor)



jjjw35@seoultech.ac.kr